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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates Bulgaria’s trade strategy towards the European
Economic Community (EEC) in the 1970s: a decade of intensified
economic exchange between East and West thanks to détente and,
simultaneously, of growing trade barriers due to the consolidation of
the EEC’s Common Market. The successes and failures of Bulgaria’s
endeavours are discussed through a study of economic cooperation
with Denmark before and after its accession to the EEC in 1973. The
main argument is that while Bulgarian economic policy focused on the
rising regulatory impediments to tradewith EECmembers, it neglected
the structural deficiencies of Bulgarian export production. Thereby,
Bulgarian state officials strove to resolve foreign trade problems
through diplomatic negotiations over customs regulations instead of
advancing domestic economic reforms . This argument is supported by
analysis of intergovernmental economic negotiations and trade deals
between Bulgaria and Denmark during the 1970s. It highlights the
different ways in which Bulgarian trade envoys in Copenhagen and
top officials at home evaluated recurrent problems in accessing the
Danish market and formulated solutions for these problems. Thus,
instead of tackling internal structural problems, the blueprints for
Bulgaria’s foreign trade focused on external foes, namely trade discri-
mination against socialist countries.
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In the summer of 1972, the Bulgarian trade attachés stationed in the West convened in
Sofia to deliberate on global market trends and how they impacted on the prospects of
Bulgarian trade with the developed capitalist economies.1 Although issues of long-
distance trade also entered the discussion, the focus was firmly on the European
Economic Community (EEC), also known as the Common Market, which accounted
for the major part of Bulgarian commercial transactions outside of the Soviet bloc.2 The
most pressing questions stemmed from the changing relations between the EEC and
Bulgaria in light of the Community’s supranational regulations of members’ trade with
non-members and their discriminatory thrust specifically towards the socialist states.
The urgency of this problem was twofold due to the broadening of both EEC compe-
tence and membership, that is, the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy
(CCP) and the upcoming accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland.3
Despite their concerns about rising trade barriers, the attending attachés all veered
into far more mundane trade problems once they got the chance to speak out. The
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source of all these problems was Bulgarian producers, as illustrated by the trade
representative in Brussels: ‘We asked two Belgian machine-building enterprises to test
our electric trucks and they agreed. But [the trucks] travelled five months [. . .]. Finally,
the trucks arrive and it turns out that their ignition keys are missing.’4 A similar
complaint was voiced by his colleague in Stockholm:
It often happens that we work on [the placement of] a certain product but when we come
to an agreement and the deal is sealed, the enterprise says this product is no longer
available and they cannot deliver. For four years, Electroimpex has wanted to sell cables in
Sweden. When we arranged a deal for them, they said they didn’t have cables.5
Dimitar Alexiev, trade attaché in Copenhagen, discussed at length the repercussions of
Denmark’s approaching entry to the EEC on bilateral trade only to get back to the same
frustrations with home organizations that had nothing to do with the changing terms of
trade. At the end of the day, he concluded, the main problem was their ‘sluggishness’ that
spoilt actual opportunities for exports to the Danish market.6
Based on an in-depth study of Bulgarian–Danish economic cooperation, this paper
tackles the Bulgarian foreign-trade strategy vis-à-vis the EEC in the 1970s: a decade of
intensified economic exchange between East and West thanks to détente and, simulta-
neously, of growing trade barriers between the two halves of Europe due to the EEC’s
deepening integration. The main argument is that while the Bulgarian government
focused on the tightening regulatory impediments to access the Common Market, it
largely evaded the structural deficiencies of its export production. While at home
bureaucrats had been experimenting with various administrative measures to raise
production quality and thereby customer satisfaction ever since the early 1960s, as
long as these measures steered clear of in-depth reform of the central planning system,
they failed to incentivise producers to boost quality rather than quantity.7 In foreign
trade, consequentially, Bulgarian state officials concentrated their efforts on resolving
foreign-trade problems through futile diplomatic negotiations instead of advancing
domestic economic reforms.
While seemingly less important than Bulgarian trade relations with larger Western
European countries like the FRG, Italy and France, cooperation with Denmark provides
solid grounds for a study of East–West exchange at the cross-section of new opportunities
for political dialogue opened by détente and new difficulties for economic cooperation due
to the consolidation of the Common Market. On the one hand, Denmark was a strong
supporter of East–West rapprochement playing a significant role in the détente process in
Europe.8 On the other, its entry into the EEC in January 1973 occurred at a moment when
its commercial relations with socialist countries and Bulgaria in particular were already well
established. Rather than a starting limitation as in the case of Bulgaria's main Western
partners, therefore, the Danish membership in the EEC represented a sudden disruption.
Denmark’s accession, however went through a five-year transition period of gradual
harmonization of external tariffs. This gave its socialist trade partners time to reassess
their strategy, to test new approaches and explore alternative options to circumvent rising
barriers. These attempts were particularly urgent because the stakes also went up due to the
looming threat of the CCP, which would eventually transfer the rights to negotiate
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international commercial agreements from the individual EEC members to the suprana-
tional body of the EC Commission.
Bulgaria’s economic relations with Denmark had thus far evolved on pragmatic
terms, nurtured throughout the 1960s by business operatives rather than politicians.
This had not been the case with economic partnerships with the FRG, the main trade
partner of socialist Bulgaria in the West, where geopolitical considerations often ran
contrary to economic interests.9 In the 1970s, however, Danish membership in the EEC
catapulted bilateral economic relations into the middle of the political stalemate
between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).10 The
intricacies of upholding the Soviet bloc’s policy of non-recognition of the EEC’s
authority while preserving access to its markets posed a new challenge for Bulgaria’s
cooperation with Denmark – a challenge of a political, not purely an economic nature.
The political search for solutions subsequently obscured persistent pragmatic problems
in Bulgarian–Danish economic partnerships. This caused a dissonance in the views of
the Bulgarian foreign-trade operatives in Copenhagen and their superiors in the
government.
Through a case study on Bulgarian–Danish economic cooperation, this paper therefore
provides a qualified assessment of the impact of the Common Market on the trade
strategies of the socialist regimes towards Western Europe. It is based on declassified
documents from Bulgaria’s Central State Archives as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives concerning both the macro-strategy of Bulgarian foreign trade towards the EEC
and the activities on the ground of the trade envoys in Denmark.11 Documents from the
Danish National Archives regarding relations with Bulgaria are also consulted to corrobo-
rate the viewpoints of Bulgarian institutions. The analysis juxtaposes the perspectives of
Bulgarian state officials and foreign-trade operatives towards the pressing problems they
identified, and the successes and failures of the strategies they devised to tackle these
problems.
The spur of Bulgarian economic reforms in the 1960s and the start of
economic cooperation with Denmark
In the early 1960s, the Bulgarian regime made cautious attempts at economic reforms
following a general trend throughout the Soviet bloc whose most radical manifestation
would eventually take shape in Czechoslovakia and precipitate the Prague Spring.12 The
shared impetus of bloc-wide reforms was industrial modernization through a shift from
extensive to intensive growth. Like elsewhere in the bloc, the overhaul of the economic
base in Bulgaria necessitated both institutional and technological improvements. The
first reform component, institutional change, was founded on a relative decentralization
of the planning process: that is, increasing the managerial powers of enterprises to
determine plan targets, negotiate purchases and sales, and decide on the allocation of
profits.13 Technological upgrade, for its part, was largely conditional on transfer of
knowhow and factory equipment from the West, since both domestic and bloc
advancement in production facilities was stalled by the accelerated industrialization
during the Stalinist era.14 Taken together, these two factors pushed Eastern European
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countries towards an economic course that would lead them to a growing interpene-
tration with the capitalist world from the 1960s onwards.
Not matching the economic policy of quasi-liberalization, the financial policy retained
central price-setting, which not only isolated the socialist economies from the worldmarket
but also eliminated incentives for innovations and quality improvements among the
domestic producers.15 While the CMEA market accommodated the financial inflexibility
of socialist economies by facilitating barter transactions, the Western markets became
crucial for high-quality imports.16 Inevitably, therefore, exports to Western markets
became indispensable for generating hard currency to pay for such purchases. In the
Bulgarian case, this vicious circle was exacerbated by the fact that a large share of the
export production consisted of agricultural goods, which were undervalued on the CMEA
market.17 Agricultural exports also confronted protectionist restrictions on the Western
European markets. In effect, despite being the most foreign-trade oriented country within
the Soviet bloc (proportionately to its industrial output), Bulgaria remained the country
with the highest share of exports tied to fraternal countries (Table 1).18 Held back by belated
industrialization, its national production was poorly suited to respond to the demands of
foreign customers. Moreover, under the paternalistic conditions of the planned economy,
producers were unmotivated to do so, given the secure ‘sellers’ market’ at home.19
These predicaments prompted the Bulgarian foreign-trade officials to search for new
markets in the West and thus to tackle qualitative problems with essentially quantitative
measures. In the late 1950s, Denmark fell into the scope of this endeavour despite the
geographical distance and historical unfamiliarity between the two countries. After
the Second World War, bilateral relations were limited to a trade agreement signed in 1947
Table 1. Distribution of Bulgaria’s imports and exports by blocs and some countries (including Denmark),
1960–80.
Country/Year 1960 1965 1970 1974 1976 1978 1980
CMEA total Import 80.8% 72.3% 74.8% 67.9% 75.4% 80.1% 77.1%
Export 81.3% 77.4% 77.4% 73.1% 78.2% 76.7% 68.8%
Soviet Union Import 52.5% 50.0% 52.2% 43.6% 54.4% 59.5% 57.3%
Export 53.8% 52.2% 53.8% 50.3% 54.2% 53.9% 50.0%
Non-CMEA socialist countries total Import 3.1% 1.9% 1.4% 2.2% 1.7% 1.4% 1.8%
Export 2.7% 2.0% 1.9% 2.9% 2.1% 2.4% 2.0%
Developed capitalist countries total Import 13.7% 22.3% 19.1% 22.5% 18.5% 15.0% 17.2%
Export 12.5% 15.9% 14.2% 11.7% 10.5% 9.8% 15.8%
FRG Import 6.0% 5.8% 2.7% 7.0% 5.8% 4.5% 4.8%
Export 3.3% 3.1% 2.6% 2.5% 2.1% 1.6% 2.6%
France Import 1.2% 2.1% 2.4% 1.7% 1.9% 1.2% 1.8%
Export 0.9% 0.6% 1.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%
Italy Import 1.1% 2.8% 3.1% 2.4% 1.6% 1.4% 1.4%
Export 1.7% 3.3% 2.8% 2.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.4%
Denmark Import n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Export 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Norway Import 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0% 0.0%
Export 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sweden Import 0.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4%
Export 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2%
Developing countries total Import 2.4% 3.5% 4.7% 7.4% 4.4% 3.5% 3.9%
Export 3.5% 4.7% 6.5% 12.3% 9.2% 11.1% 13.4%
Total in valuten lev (millions) Import 740.1 1377.9 2142.3 4195.8 5436.0 6800.9 8282.9
Export 668.6 1375.7 2344.5 3720.8 5199.8 6649.6 8901.5
Source: Compiled by author based on Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1979, 376–8; Statisticheski Godishnik na NRB 1985,
370–2.
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shortly before the nationalization of the Bulgarian economy started.20 Under the ensuing
autarchic turn, for more than a decade the agreement remained just a legal framework with
no practical effects. It was only after 1960, when Bulgaria’s Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT)
opened a trade representation (Bultarg) in Copenhagen, that commercial transactions
between the two countries began to pick up.
In the following years, bilateral trade became a major channel for the nascent contacts
between the two countries. The Bulgarian trade envoys in Copenhagen took the lead in
bridge-building, as neither country had yet dispatched a resident ambassador to the other:
as of 1957 the Bulgarian ambassador to Sweden was accredited also to Denmark and
Norway, but even after Bulgaria opened an embassy in Copenhagen in the mid-1960s, it
would take some years for full-fledged diplomatic representation.21 Although Bultarg’s
employees were newcomers in the Danish business field, they quickly identified promising
niches for Bulgarian products in the Danish market. Furthermore, they perceived the
Danish economy as a model for the ongoing industrial modernization at home. As
Bultarg argued time and again, both Bulgaria and Denmark had been agricultural countries
prior to the Second World War that set out to industrialize in the post-war era.22 In the
1960s, their industrial outputs for external markets were limited in range. Yet, the bulk of
Danish industrial exports – factory assemblage including patents, knowhow, construction
and machine equipment – attained a high standard, albeit concentrated in specific niches.
The narrow industrial profile of Denmark – similar to Bulgaria’s low level of industrializa-
tion – hampered its trade flexibility and indeed both countries suffered from trade deficits.
Trade contacts between Bulgaria and Denmark opened up some beneficial opportunities
for matching their economies. In manufacturing, Bultarg Copenhagen perceived as parti-
cularly attractive cooperation contracts in which Danish companies supplied Bulgarian
factories with complex equipment while Bulgarian costs were offset through compensatory
sales of produce or joint participation in industrial projects in third countries. In agricul-
ture, Bulgaria found a welcomingmarket in Denmark for early-season vegetables and fruits
due to climatic differences, while at the same time pursuing options to import knowhow
and technology for the industrialization of its own farming and stock-breading.23
In 1962, Bulgaria and Denmark signed a Long-term Trade Agreement with a validity of
three years, followed by a five-year renewal (1966–70).24 Under this treaty, Bulgarian
imports reached a higher level of liberalization, with 30% remaining under quota
restrictions.25 Trade quotas, however, were hardly an impediment to trade expansion. As
noted by the Danish authorities, actual deals rarely filled up the negotiated contingents.26
Nevertheless, bilateral trade volume gradually increased: doubling its value from US
$0.6 million in 1960 to US$1.2 million in 1962, it continued growing to approximately
US$5million in 1968, which would be its median level until Denmark’s entry to the EEC.27
All the while, Bulgaria struggled with a trade deficit in the margins between US$0.2 million
(1960) and US$2.1 million (1965).28
Towards the end of the 1960s, Bulgaria and Denmark signed another accord which
aimed to expand the scope of their economic relations – the Agreement on Economic,
Industrial and Technological Cooperation.29 It was negotiated in the first top-level inter-
governmental talks during an exchange of visits by their ministers of foreign affairs in
1967.30 This accord laid the grounds for the establishment of another institutional platform
to promote economic cooperation: the Mixed Bulgarian–Danish Commission for
Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation (MBDC).31
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The abrupt end of Bulgaria’s economic reforms in 1968 and new guidelines
for trade with the EEC
The crackdown of the Prague Spring – understood by the Bulgarian Communist Party
(Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya, BKP) as a change of wind across the bloc – pushed the
regime towards a more conservative course in economic management. The backlash
against the foreign-trade sector in Bulgaria was particularly strong. Not only did it suffer
major purges, including the Minister, but centralized control over its operatives was also
tightened with the new Foreign Trade Act of 1969.32 In the short span of 1969–72, the
macro-strategy for trade with capitalist countries underwent revisions at the party’s top
level, and of these, many focused on the EEC.
In fact, the BKP had never yet specifically addressed the issue of the Common Market
though it had not been completely oblivious. It was the enhanced EEC’s regulatory
discrimination towards the socialist camp that placed the Common Market on the agenda
of the BKP’s Politburo for the first time in January 1968. At this point, the party’s top brass
endorsed a five-page document entitled ‘Considerations for the directions of the foreign-
economic relations of PRB [People’s Republic of Bulgaria] with the countries in the EEC
(Common Market)’.
Its preamble emphasized the need to expand and deepen economic ties with the EEC
members and other capitalist states for the import of high-tech factory equipment, machines
and licences as well as prime and raw materials. The fundamental policy goal, formulated
further on, was to ‘secure the most favourable conditions, despite the growing discriminatory
measures’.33 The document envisaged bilateral negotiations with individual EEC members,
a task assigned to the MFT and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), leaving enough room
for the two ministries to devise their course of action. The general objectives included
bargaining for elimination of protectionist non-tariff barriers and official requests for making
restrictions flexible. However, the only domestic measure in the party strategy was an
amendment of the Bulgarian customs system – through the introduction of differential
rates based on reciprocity.34 This was specifically planned to serve as leverage in bargaining
with the EEC countries, though clearly in a bold overestimation of Bulgaria’s bargaining
position.
The party programme was appended with a memorandum by Bulgaria’s permanent
representative at the CMEA, Tano Tsolov, which explained the nature of the EEC and
underlined its growing share in Bulgaria’s trade volume – represented by a fourfold increase
between 1961 and 1966 when the total volume only doubled.35 Expressing alarm that
Bulgarian imports from the EEC twice exceeded reverse exports, Tsolov emphasized
a continuous trend of import dependency on the EEC countries for complex machinery
and synthetic production inputs, as well as an urgent need to increase the national export
capabilities.
A year later, in May 1969, the Politburo passed a much lengthier resolution on the ‘Chief
guidelines and main tasks of the foreign policy of People's Republic of Bulgaria PRB by
regions and countries’. Its general tone regarding the West was hardened, in an interna-
tional situation assessed as one of intensified ideological struggle.36 Yet, it also underscored
Bulgaria’s successful advances in its relations with certain European capitalist counties,
among them the entire Scandinavian region.37 Further on, the strategy demanded closer
cooperation between the MFA and the economic ministries, as well as between the
6 E. STANOEVA
Bulgarian embassies and trade representations, noting that the central task of the diplo-
matic missions was economic. In the paragraphs on operational weaknesses, therefore, the
main shortcoming of the diplomatic corps in the EEC countries was ‘their insufficient effort
to eliminate the significant trade deficits’ and to counter the discriminatory measures of the
Common Market.38 Ultimately, the new instructions were not that different from the old:
diverting exports to countries with lesser trade restrictions and reducing imports to what
was ‘truly indispensable’.39
Following the ratification of Bulgaria’s foreign-policy strategy, in July 1969 the MFT
submitted to the Politburo its own ‘Conception on the strategy and tactics of foreign
trade’, a document of more than 200 pages. Unsurprisingly, the main objective vis-à-vis the
West was the elimination of Bulgaria’s trade deficit.40 Three years later, in April 1972, the
MFT submitted another comprehensive strategy for its sector with a time span until
1990.41 The rubric on developed capitalist countries opened up with more antagonistic
wording: ‘to wage a struggle against all restrictions that individual capitalist countries and
their closed economic groupings raise against the equal and mutually beneficial develop-
ment of world trade and above all trade with socialist countries’.42 Yet, in its particulars,
the strategy conceded the economic necessity of continuing trade with the EEC and looked
for options to secure preferential treatment. The Scandinavian region was once again
accentuated as a priority zone for expanding Bulgaria’s economic relations with capitalist
countries. In addition, the document called for protecting the interests of the socialist
countries on the markets of the new EEC members, including Denmark.43
The period 1969–72, during which cosmetic revisions of Bulgaria’s foreign-trade
policy were regularly rolled out in response to its growing difficulties in accessing the
Common Market, coincided with Denmark’s negotiations for EEC membership.
Ironically, this was also the time when the Bulgarian regime attributed a higher priority
in economic cooperation to the Scandinavian region, including Denmark. And 1973,
the year of Denmark’s accession to the EEC, was also the moment when Veselin
Belomazhov arrived in Copenhagen as the first Bulgarian ambassador stationed in
Denmark, thus signifying its increased importance in Bulgarian foreign policy.44
External challenges to Bulgaria’s economic cooperation with Denmark in
the 1970s: the Common Market and rising trade barriers
Under more concerted efforts on the side of Bulgarian institutions, the 1970s brought
new opportunities for Bulgaria’s cooperation with Denmark, but also new challenges.
The consequences of Denmark’s entry into the EEC in January 1973 were a topic of
much discussion in the analyses sent by the Bulgarian foreign service, focusing exclu-
sively on what this would mean for trade. The concerns spurred by Denmark’s
upcoming membership to a great extent shaped Bulgaria’s bargaining strategy in
1970, when a new Long-term Trade Agreement for the subsequent five-year term was
being negotiated.45 The Bulgarian side requested a most-favoured nation (MFN) clause,
which was turned down by the Danish government with the argument that it went
against its established practice vis-à-vis the socialist countries.46 Another declined
Bulgarian proposal that tried to push through the MFN clause was an additional
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which also got rejected.47 As the Bulgarian envoys
pressed on, taking advantage of any bilateral contact to bring up the issue, the Danes
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pointed out that the proposed treaty was simply redundant. Its commercial aspects
overlapped with the trade agreement under renewal and its navigation-related clauses
were superfluous given the negligible exchange of ships between the respective ports.48
The fact that the Bulgarian state did not give up on its ideas to expand cooperation
notwithstanding the low interest of both parties in the areas in question can be
interpreted as a panic reaction to the prospect of losing any ground gained in the
previous years. Since Bulgaria was hardly a major trade partner for Denmark in the
socialist camp, its insistence on a long-term arrangement that no other CMEA state had
yet achieved, even though of little practical value, would serve to place the country in
a somewhat privileged position once Denmark had sealed its membership of the EEC.
An unexpected outcome of this painstaking bargaining was the discovery of a bilateral
memorandum with MFN provisions from 1921–2, which was apparently still valid.49
Arguing that it had not been revoked in the post-war era, the Bulgarian officials
eventually managed to obtain MFN treatment in terms of export-import tariffs and
transit of goods.50 More importantly, despite the initial uncertainty regarding the
expiration date of the newly signed Long-term Trade Agreement due to Denmark’s
EEC membership, its validity was secured until the end of 1975 as one of the exemp-
tions granted by the EC Commission to member states.51
Despite the Bulgarian sense of success, the long-desired MFN clause did not have much
practical weight, as Denmark reserved its right to modify its treaty obligations in accor-
dance with the EEC regulations and declared this arrangement as ‘having only symbolic
meaning’.52 For this reason, Bulgaria soon refocused its diplomatic efforts on the renewal of
the cooperation agreement of 1967. This type of bilateral accord was exempt from the
supranational authority of the EEC and could be negotiated independently by themembers,
unlike the strictly commercial agreements. This normative difference made the cooperation
agreements highly desirable for all socialist countries as a potential loophole, in their view at
least, from the EEC legal restrictions on trade deals with non-members.53 Throughout the
entire negotiation process for the renewal of the cooperation agreement with Bulgaria, the
Danish government emphasized time and again that any phrasing alluding to trade would
not be accepted. As Bulgaria had already signed such agreements with the UK, Italy, France
and Belgium, the negotiating party was well aware of this condition and seemingly
restrained from such overtures. Yet, it was the Minister of Foreign Trade that prepared
the Bulgarian draft for the agreement, although it was de jure under the auspices of another
state branch, the Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation
(CESTC).54 Eventually, the treaty entitled Long-term Agreement on the Development of
Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technological Cooperation was signed in 1975 for
a term of 10 years.55
In the meantime, the implementation of the EEC’s CCP was caught in a limbo of
provisional extensions. Thanks to this stalling, the Bulgarian–Danish trade agreement
earned an extra year, as the curious memorandum from 1921–2 was included among
individual members’ agreements with non-members, permitted to operate with tacit
consent until the end of 1976. For Bulgaria, only four pre-existing settlements with EEC
members were indexed in this resolution and the one with Denmark was the most
impactful for its trade with the Common Market.56
Despite moderate Bulgarian achievements in trade bargaining, Denmark’s customs tariffs
were meanwhile synchronized with those of the Common Market. As a consequence,
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Bulgarian imports were hurt in light of their large share of agricultural products which faced
the hardest protectionist barriers. Simultaneously, another important group of Bulgarian
products, textile and apparel, confronted the limits of national import quotas that Denmark
refused to liberalize.57 Increasing exports of manufactured goods and machinery, a long-
standing priority for Bulgaria’s foreign trade, was assuming new urgency.
Internal challenges to economic cooperation with Denmark in the 1970s:
structural deficiencies of the planned economy
The hurdles of the bureaucratic process of economic management
Despite all diplomatic efforts in negotiating better terms of trade with Denmark and futile
attempts to bypass the EEC’s discriminatory measures through bilateral arrangements,
Bulgaria’s exports to Denmark were harmed mainly by structural problems in the planned
economy. Once reforms of decentralization were aborted in 1968, these problems persisted.
As economic deals with Denmark in the 1970s grew in complexity and often magnitude,
these structural problems only exacerbated the failures of Bulgarian exports.
By 1970, the Bulgarian trade envoys in Copenhagen had managed to build some
durable partnerships with initially reluctant Danish firms, while at the same time
familiarizing themselves with the business conjuncture in the country: customs regula-
tions, price fluctuations and market competition, as well as business ethos and practices.
Given the nature of the planned economy, where all the export contingents had to be
determined in advance and integrated into the annual plans of several organizations
along the production and distribution chain, Bultarg Copenhagen was aiming not at
sporadic deals, but at stable and durable economic relations.
The work of the trade representatives, however, was ridden with problems originat-
ing back home rather than on the foreign terrain where they operated. While they
maintained direct contacts with Danish firms, on their home front they were far more
constrained due to the lengthy administrative chain of communication and execution of
negotiated transactions. Apart from superiors at the MFT who set up the annual plans
for the goods exchange between Bulgaria and Denmark, the concrete deals and deliv-
eries were a prerogative of the Bulgarian foreign-trade organizations (FTOs), state-run
enterprises specialized in certain production sectors and, in turn, filling their commod-
ity stocks from a number of national producers. Throughout the period, there were
approximately 20 FTOs working with the Copenhagen office.
As both trade and production were placed under the Bulgarian central administration,
the link between FTOs and producers was complicated by the mediation of several sectoral
apparatuses responsible for various production domains. Thus, whereas the annual plans of
Bultarg Copenhagen itemised contingents to be delivered by each FTO to the Danish
market, the plans of the individual FTOs specified the amounts to be pulled from various
producers along with the projected profits and currency revenues. Most delivery failures
indeed originated in manufacturing due to producers’ disincentive to venture into more
demanding foreignmarkets.58 Given the bureaucratic practices of reporting plan fulfilment,
the FTOs as well as the manufacturing enterprises approached their contractual obligations
as a zero-sum game: underachievement in one area could easily be compensated by over-
achievement in another.
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Bultarg Copenhagen, however, had much less space to manoeuvre within its plan and
the disturbances caused by the careless adherence to the plan by others had damaging
effects not only on its own plan fulfilment, but moreover on the contacts that it had
painstakingly built in the Danish business community.59Whereas for the organizations at
home, commodity contingents were often seen as numbers to be randomly shifted
around the overall plan, for the envoys abroad all contract violations meant that the
search for prospective Danish partners had to start anew. The Bulgarian representatives
were also well aware that news travelled fast around the business community of the host
country and breached contracts tainted the reputation of Bulgarian foreign trade.
With the arrival of Ambassador Belomazhov in Copenhagen in 1973, the trade envoys
found a stronger diplomatic backing that helped increase their outreach to Danish eco-
nomic authorities. Previously serving at the Bulgarian delegation at the CMEA,
Belomazhov became particularly active in economic affairs, collecting and communicating
additional information on Danish companies in priority fields for Bulgarian industrial
modernization and often accompanying the trade representatives during high-profile
business meetings. Despite this, many of the breakthroughs he accomplished fell on deaf
ears at home, stirring his frustration with the inefficiency of domestic institutions, as
attested in his communication with the MFA.60
The secondmajor actor in advancing Danish–Bulgarian economic relations, theMBDC,
entered the field in 1968.61 As a two-party body, the MBDC was under the supervision of
two governmental entities – the Danish Committee on Industrial-Technological
Cooperation and the Bulgarian CESTC. From its founding, the Chairman of the Danish
party was Knudt Hanover, who was the head of the Danish government agency and who
subsequently took the lead in all joint committees of this kind with socialist countries; the
Bulgarian counterpart was presided over by the CESTC’s deputy chairman, Alexander
Dimitrov.62 The objectives of the MBDC encompassed the educational exchange of
specialists and the transfer of scientific and technical information, as well as the facilitation
of direct contacts between firms and institutes, industrial assistance and joint projects
between interested enterprises.
However, as soon became clear, the two national parties had divergent priorities in
pursuing these goals, hence no substantial results occurred.63 On the one hand, the
Bulgarian side avoided discussing issues of trade as it tried not to interfere in the foreign
trade’s parallel chain of command.64 So it consistently turned down Danish proposals
involving commercial commitments. What it was truly interested in was the transfer of
knowledge mainly through the specializations of Bulgarian experts in Denmark, as in this
field Denmark had much more to offer than Bulgaria could reciprocate. On the other
hand, the Danish party, where initiative seemed to be dominated by entrepreneurs,
showed exclusive interest in cooperation that could yield tangible financial returns – so
most of their proposals touched upon matters of trade.65
The MBDC sessions, convened once a year alternating between Sofia and Copenhagen,
proceeded as an exchange of concrete proposals for cooperation – each centred on an
interested national enterprise and presenting its needs or capabilities. After the session, the
two parties were responsible for circulating the submitted proposals among potential
partners in their own country. On the Bulgarian side, this was usually the point where
anticipated cooperation went into a dead end: Danish proposals were distributed among
the sectoral ministries, which had to evaluate them vis-à-vis amultitude of plan targets, then
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refer them to particular manufacturing branches from where they were forwarded to
individual factories or enterprises. This lengthy bureaucratic path was rarely completed
and a consistent complaint of the Danish party was the lack of any response to their
proposals.66 Adding to this impasse, Bulgarian proposals that found an interested partner
in Denmark more often than not bore no results: once shifted from the CESTC to the
appropriate ministry, they simply sank in its bureaucratic machinery. Even successful
contracts had a negotiating cycle that was too protracted for the Danish taste.67
While the Danes at the MBDC were clearly losing patience with the bureaucratic travails,
some improvement was noted by Knudt Hanover, thanks to the appointment of Vladimir
Ganovski, an engineer, not a bureaucrat, as a head of the Bulgarian party for the fourth and
fifth sessions in 1971–2. Still, Hanover complained openly about the futility of these meetings
to carry through any binding decisions. He also objected that Bultarg Copenhagen made
direct contacts with Danish firms, thus side-lining the Commission, and threatened to
resign.68
In 1977, the Bulgarian chairmanship at the MBDC was taken over by high-ranking
officials at the MFT. Although this sectoral shift could have signalled more willingness
for commercial negotiations, the Bulgarian party continued to suppress Danish trade
proposals.69 Instead of promoting trade deals, this reorganization seemed to be moti-
vated by a new government strategy for negotiations with the EEC. It attempted to use
the bilateral commission as a platform to lobby for preferential treatment of Bulgarian
exports to the Common Market. Albeit with a steadily low rate of cooperation contracts
due to Bulgarian passivity, the MBDC continued its operation into the 1980s. While the
Danes did not give up on exploring opportunities for commercial deals, the Bulgarians
intensified their attempts to co-opt Danish assistance for a potential application to the
EEC’s Generalised System of Preferences.70
The low quality of the national production
Under the endeavours of Bultarg Copenhagen and the MBDC, which sometimes
intersected but rarely coordinated thoroughly, both trade and industrial cooperation
between Bulgaria and Denmark increased, albeit modestly, throughout the 1970s. While
customs tariffs and trade quotas had been high on the agenda of Bulgarian state officials
as a major cause of the trade deficit with the EEC members including Denmark,
Bulgarian exports were continuously hurt by problems with quality, leading to costly
reclaims and annulment of contracts. While the attention of the government focused on
fighting international regulatory arrangements beyond its control, it failed to resolve
domestic problems of low production quality, which were in fact within its prerogatives.
A chief guideline in Bulgarian trade was to increase the share of machinery in the
overall volume of exports, as such commodities bypassed the barriers confronted by
agricultural and textile goods. The fluctuations in the share of machinery exports over
the years were duly noted in every annual report of Bultarg Copenhagen to the MFT,
rising from 3% in 1965 to 20% in 1967 and 40% in 1970, then down to 16% in 1972 and
up to 42% in 1975. Yet, any substantive increase inevitably rested only upon one or two
contracts.71 And these contracts proved to be quite vulnerable to defunct execution by
Bulgarian factories and often collapsed long before their envisaged expiration date.
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Recurrent violations of trade contracts included delays in supplies or complete
failure to deliver contracted items, as well as lower quality compared to presented
samples and negotiated specifics or irreparable defects. Delays were sometimes caused
by the Bulgarian transportation company, and this further complicated accountability
at home. Drops in quality or non-delivery at times resulted from industrial restructur-
ing in Bulgaria that moved manufactures from one production sector into another or
reassigned production lines from one factory to another. Overall, the lengthy chain of
command on the Bulgarian side seriously impeded Danish importers from exerting any
control over their purchases or oversight on the shipments. Among other typical
problems that Bultarg Copenhagen confronted when trying to secure Danish buyers
were bad packaging and transportation, non-compliance with national standards (in
sizes, products’ information sheets and consumer preferences), lack of spare parts or
protracted repairs, unrealistically inflated prices, and disregard for the conventional
payment arrangements in Denmark.72 Generally, the annual trade reports from
Copenhagen show an erratic plan fulfilment by the FTOs (Table 2).
Three of the major export deals in Denmark illustrate these internal problems well: the
largest export line for the textile industry, a contract for menswear between the Danish
company Fionette A/S and the Bulgarian factory Vitosha represented by FTO
Industrialimport; a contract for joint production of motor trucks between Je-Lau Lemvig,
on the one hand, and Balkancar factory and FTO Balkancarimpex on the other; and
a contract for jackscrews between V. M. Christensen and Dunav-Oryahovo factory,
respectively FTO Autoimpex. All of them were sealed prior to Denmark’s accession to
the EEC and secured a long-term distribution of prioritized Bulgarian exports to the Danish
market under favourable conditions and with significant envisaged profits. As discussed in
Table 2. The operation of the 10 largest Bulgarian FTOs in Denmark 1973–5: discrepancies between
export targets (plan), negotiated sales (deals) and actual delivery of goods (export)
1973 1974 1975
Plan Deals Export Plan Deals Export Plan Deals Export
Foreign trade organization/types of goods in its
export nomenclature Values in valuten lev (thousands) and % fulfilment
Bulgarplodexport (fruits and vegetables) 494 n.d. 117% 650 – 67% 850 98% 81%
Bulgarkonserv (preserved fruits and vegetables) 655 – 108% 1,000 124% 60% 900 102% 88%
Vinimpex (wine, brandy and other liquors) 100 – 129% 200 – 81% 150 107% 99%
Industrialimport (textile, leather, glassware) 810 162% 144% 2,480 – 46% 900 69% 61%
Raznoiznos (toys, ceramics, carpets) 210 17% 15% 80 109% 70% 100 66% 66%
Autoimpex (jackscrews, mopeds) 720 – 25% 250 – 64% 200 93% 89%
Balkancarimpex (trucks, telphers, car batteries) 250 – 28% 200 584% 484% 1,700 90% 90%
Electroimpex (electric engines, loud speakers) 410 – 110% 500 – 89% 600 70% 67%
Cherna Metalurgiya (steel, cast iron) 200 – 22% – – – 105 100% 100%
Rudmetal (pipes, tin, non-ferrous metals) 300 – 8% 2,100 – 0% 50 8% 0%
Pharmachim (pharmaceutical substances,drugs) 270 – 30% 100 – 102% 100 249% 249%
Source: Compiled by author based on the following sources: TES at the Bulgarian Embassy in Copenhagen: reports by
managers in charge of merchandise exchange on exports to Denmark of individual FTOs in 1973 to D. Alexiev, trade
representative, TsDA, f. 259, op. 36, a.e. 402, l. 96–174; Report by P. Valchev, trade representative in Copenhagen, to
MFT on Bultarg’s activity in 1974, TsDA, f. 259, op. 39, a.e. 171, l. 16–106; TES at the Bulgarian Embassy in
Copenhagen: reports by managers in charge of merchandise exchange on exports to Denmark of individual FTOs
in 1975 to P. Valchev, trade representative, TsDA, f. 259, op. 39, a.e. 232, l. 2–102; Report by D. Dimitrov, manager in
charge of merchandise exchange, to P. Valchev regarding export plan’s fulfilment with products from Balkancarimpex’
nomenclature in the first half of 1975, 20/06/1975, TsDA, f. 259, op. 39, a.e. 230, l. 1–6; Report by P. Valchev to MFT
regarding TES’ activity on Bulgarian–Danish trade in 1975, 26/01/1976, TsDA, f. 1244, op. 1, a.e. 8142, l. 66.
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detail later in this article, all deals were shaken by production problems in Bulgaria and only
one survived its entire term.
In late 1971, with the assistance of Bultarg Copenhagen, theDanish company Fionette A/
S increased their purchases of apparel from FTO Industrialimport (around 55,000 items of
menswear, mainly anoraks and suits) and offered to buy the entire contingent within this
trade position of Bulgaria in Denmark for the next two years. Signalling the company’s
serious business interest, its director visited Bulgaria four times in the span of nine months,
also offering free assistance in industrial modernization, including delivery of machinery
and proposals for fashion updates of production lines.73 By 1973, Fionette A/S was the
largest Danish importer of Bulgarian apparel and, based on this contract, the MFT nego-
tiated an increase in the Bulgarian export quota of apparel in the annual trade protocol with
Denmark.74 This business contact was promising enough to lead to a Bulgarian proposal for
industrial cooperation with the firm at the MBDC session in 1973 involving transfer of
equipment for new assembly lines, fashion designs and auxiliary materials against payment
in readymade production for distribution not only in Denmark, but elsewhere in Western
Europe.75
Yet, the same year, Fionette A/S annulled the purchase of 9000 suits because the
expected shipment of samples arrived too late for the presentation of seasonal collections.
Part of this contingent was subsequently sold to a Danish competitor, provoking further
discontent at Fionette A/S. At the end of 1973, 1800 suits did not reach Finette A/S within
the agreed deadline, preventing the firm from fulfilling its obligations to local stores. When
his inquiries about the shipment fell on deaf ears, the company director made independent
checks at border crossings, discovering discrepancies with the transport documentation
provided by Industrialimport.76 As this incident threatened to put an end to the entire
cooperation scheme, Bulgarian authorities launched an investigation, discovering that the
loaded trucks had made a detour of several days because the drivers were summoned to the
annual party meeting of the transportation company.77 The incident, which came on top of
previous contract breaches (mainly in quality as an entire production line was moved to
another Bulgarian factory), was apparently too much for the Danish company to tolerate.78
Although at the 1975 MBDC session the cooperation with Fionette A/S was highlighted as
a success story, that same year the company was no longer among the Danish importers on
Bultarg Copenhagen’s report on sales.79
The deal between FTO Balkancarimpex and Je-Lau Lemvig for licensing, joint produc-
tion and export of motor trucks toDenmark and third countries, signed in September 1972,
was the greatest achievement of Bultarg Copenhagen after an intense year-long effort,
because it corresponded to a crucial area of Bulgaria’s specialization within the CMEA and
opened up a rare chance to bring such products into Western markets.80 Despite his hard
work on the deal, the Bulgarian trade representative in Copenhagen was unpleasantly
surprised to be excluded from the final negotiation of the contract, the draft of which he
himself had prepared.81 The cooperation had a difficult start as already in 1973 the first
shipment of 100 motor trucks fell through, with only two prototypes being delivered. This
failure was reflected in the extreme underachievement of Balkancarimpex’ plan for
Denmark, indicating the high share of motor trucks in its exports.82
In the meantime, negotiations with F. L. Schmidt & Co. were launched for the con-
struction of a cement factory in Bulgaria, and the costs were envisaged to be partially
covered by additional contingents of motor trucks produced under the cooperation
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contract with Je-Lau, as the latter was a subsidiary of the concern. This increased the annual
production quota of the Bulgarian factory, which was already falling behind on its norms,
with 500 motor trucks a year for the next 10 years.83 In the first half of 1974, shipment
delays continued to jeopardise the entire cooperation contract, but in the second half of
the year Balkancar managed to compensate for it in some measure (208 out of 241 trucks),
though part of the batch was turned back because of defects. Nevertheless, this delivery led
to a fivefold overachievement of the FTO’s annual plan for Denmark as it constituted
almost 90% of their exports.84 Although the identified problems extended into 1975, the
Bulgarian ambassador reported this deal as a driver for the expansion of the machinery’s
share in Bulgarian exports to Denmark.85 The same year, Balkancar and Je-Lau engaged in
negotiations to expand production with two new models of heavier motor trucks.86 This
production remained the success story of Bulgarian–Danish cooperation, accounting for
30% of Bulgarian exports to Denmark by 1978.87 At the 1982 session of the MBDC, it was
cited as one of only two active cooperation agreements between Denmark and Bulgaria.88
Whereas the Je-Lau deal represented a triumph of Bulgarian–Danish economic coop-
eration, the one with V. M. Christensen, envisaged to be a second pillar of Bulgarian
machinery exports, was the most spectacular failure for Bulgarian trade with Denmark.
This cooperation contract for hydraulic automobile jackscrews was signed in March 1972
and hailed as an opportunity to increase Bulgarian sales abroad with US$1.2 million over
the course of 1972–3 alone.89 However, it also had a rough start. Deliveries were immedi-
ately reported to be ‘non-rhythmical’ and by the end of 1973, less than half of the contracted
46,000 jackscrews had been shipped.90 Nevertheless, in late 1973, the Danish firm expanded
its order with jackscrews of higher tonnage, but soon it complained to the Bulgarian
ambassador and trade representative in Copenhagen about delays in communication and
execution as well as malfunctions in the received items. In 1974, FTO Autoimpex delivered
slightly over 25% of the contracted 120,000 items, but 17% were reported unfit, which
escalated the tense business relations to a crisis, as reported by Bultarg Copenhagen.91
From the very beginning of this cooperation, Bultarg Copenhagen had been advising
Bulgarian authorities on the need to open a service station of the Bulgarian producer in
town, given the large export line, and its absence soon proved to be costly.92 Once the
dispute over the bad quality of jackscrews led to refusal of payment, it took the factory six
months to send its specialists to Denmark for an on-site inspection. Nomutually acceptable
agreement was reached and V. M. Christensen hired an external consultant to mediate in
the settlement.93 As V. M. Christensen itself had suffered reclaims from its customers and
the Bulgarian producer was stalling the repairs, the firm rejected the entire shipment
without verifying if items were functioning or not.
Once payment was cancelled, the cargo remained stranded for months in the ware-
houses of Sønderborg freight station. In December 1974, the Bulgarian side agreed to take
back all the unchecked products, but instead of terminating the dispute, this only shifted its
focus to the issue of the growing rental costs for the unpacked containers. According to the
contract, this cost was an obligation of V. M. Christensen, but the firm refused to cover it
under the circumstances. Despite the appeals of the Bulgarian trade representative to
expedite the issue, the MFT at first turned down his request to bring back the shipment
at its own expense. Throughout the ensuing legal dispute, 51 containers remained stationed
for more than a year in Denmark, causing not only a huge debt (US$34,000), but also
further damage to the contents.94
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Given the importance of this deal, its bad endwas not immediately accepted as a closure of
this export line. In Bultarg Copenhagen’s 1975 plan, FTO Autoimpex had only two positions
for exports to Denmark, and the one for jackscrews, amounting to 25% of their projected
sales, had zero fulfilment in the first half of the year. In the second half, their planned exports
were cut to one third of the initial target and yet fulfilment reached only 30%.95 In the
following year, the trade representative suggested a reduction of the FTO’s annual plan to an
eighth of the originally set volume, still basing this lower target on the hope of recovering
market opportunities for Bulgarian jackscrews inDenmark.96 At the same time, the Bulgarian
delegation at the MBDC session was still reporting the contract with V. M. Christensen as an
accomplishment in bilateral cooperation, with the optimistic note that ‘efforts are beingmade
to overcome the recently arising difficulties’.97
To sum up, despite the vigorous service of the Bulgarian envoys in Copenhagen, including
Ambassador Belomazhov, cooperation with Denmark did not go smoothly, facing the
challenges of the different work style of Bulgarian organizations and the inflexibility of
national production to improve quality in accordance with Western standards.98 Although
the main priority of the Bulgarian trade strategy was to increase the exports of machinery in
order to bring in hard currency, there were very few successfully executed deals in this area
and the one that stands out in significance was the joint production with Je-Lau. On the other
hand, the failure of high-profile contracts like the one with V. M. Christensen entailed not
only lost market opportunities, but also serious damage to the reputation of Bulgarian
production in a country that it was trying hard to enter.
Conclusion
Once Bulgaria ventured out into Western markets, the significance of foreign trade for its
planned economy was only increasing. The success of the national economic reforms was
tied from the onset to an increase in both costly imports of production equipment, inputs
and knowhow from technologically advanced Western economies as well as of high-value
exports to Western markets that could replenish the hard currency reserves of the
country.99 In the 1970s, when détente broke down barriers for diplomatic contacts, trade
became the main engine of Bulgaria’s foreign policy pursuits towards the West. However,
this was also a time when Bulgarian exports faced rising trade barriers due to the EEC’s
discrimination on trade with non-members. In this uncertain situation, the Danish market
became quite attractive for Bulgaria, prompting its foreign services to intensify their
bargaining with the Danish government in order to secure preferential treatment under
the changed terms of trade. All the while, however, Bulgarian economic exchange with
Denmark suffered from continuous problems in meeting contractual obligations and these
problems were never addressed systematically.
While much of the Bulgarian foreign policy throughout the early 1970s was dedicated to
futile attempts to renegotiate EEC policies on a bilateral basis, the regime persistently
ignored the internal obstacles to improving Bulgaria’s exports to the free market outside of
the CMEA. This study on Bulgarian–Danish economic relations demonstrates that recur-
rent problems in Bulgaria’s foreign trade were conditioned by the divergent logics of plan
fulfilment of various actors (mainly production units and trade organizations), which were
indeed structural problems of the planned economy. These internal discrepancies extended
across the national borders as the operational logic of the foreign-trade services could not
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be harmonized with that of the FTOs, and especially the national producers. The ensuing
clash of rationales translated into persistent conflicts among Bulgarian institutions and
made cooperation among sectors and organizations more confrontational than coopera-
tive. Ultimately, failures in quality and regular delivery caused by structural problems in the
planned economy proved to be a greater problem for Bulgaria’s foreign trade in the West
than the EEC’s restrictions.
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